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1959] RECENT DECISIONS 409 
CoNSTITOTIONAL LA.w-CRIMINAL PRoCEDURE-SucCESsIVE STATE PR.oSE-
cunoNs FOR SAME ACTIVITY-Petitioner. suspected of having robbed five 
persons on a sihgle occasion. was indicted and tried for the robbery of 
three of them. His sole defense was alibi and he was acquitted when only 
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one of the five victims identified him as the robber. Petitioner was then 
tried under an indictment for the robbery of a fourth victim. Petitioner 
interposed the same defense but was convicted at this second trial. The 
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. On certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court, held, affirmed, three justices dissenting.1 Neither the 
successive trials nor the failure of the court to apply the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel to the facts of this case constituted a deprivation 
of petitioner's liberty without due process of law. Hoag v. New Jersey, 
356 U.S. 464 (1958).2 
The circumstances of the principal case raise interesting questions 
regarding the protection to be afforded defendants in successive prosecu-
tions for the same allegedly criminal conduct. There are three main de-
fenses to such prosecutions: double jeopardy, collateral estoppel and due 
process· of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Jeopardy attaches when a 
jury·is impaneled to try the accused on a valid indictment or information 
before a court of competent jurisdiction,3 and the double jeopardy safe-
guard is designed to prevent a second prosecution for the same offense.4 
Double jeopardy frequently fails to provide adequate protection against 
harassment by successive prosecutions, however, because of the narrow 
meaning given the phrase "same offense."5 In a majority of states the 
offenses charged are not the same unless the facts alleged in the second 
indictment, if given in evidence, would have supported a conviction on 
l Chief Justice Warren dissented on the ground that due process includes collateral 
~toppel and the trial court improperly refused to apply the doctrine. Justice Douglas, 
with Justice Black concurring, dissented on the basis of Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 
184 (1957), apparently viewing that case as establishing a "same transaction" definition 
of "same offense" for purposes of double jeopardy. In this connection it should be remem-
bered that Justices Black and Douglas have supported the proposition that the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates the Fifth Amendment. See their dissenting opinion in Adamson 
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 68 (1947). 
· 2 In a companion case petitioner was charged in four separate indictments with 
the murder of his wife and three children, all of whom were found in a burning building 
with bullet wounds in their .heads. In three successive trials petitioner was convicted of 
first degree murder of his wife and two of the children respectively. In the first two trials 
the penalty imposed was imprisonment while in the third the penalty was death. The 
Court upheld this third conviction, four justices dissenting (including Justice Brennan 
who had disqualified himself in the Hoag case), despite the fact that evidence of all four 
deaths was allowed to go to the jury over petitioner's objections in each of the trials. 
The Court relied on the reasoning of the Hoag case. Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958). 
3 McCarthy v. Zerbst, (10th Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 640, cert. den. 299 U.S. 610 (1936); 
People ex rel. Meyer v. Warden, 269 N.Y. 426, 199 N.E. 647 (1936). 
4 The double jeopardy provisions of most state constitutions are similar to the federal 
provision, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb." U.S. CONST., Amend. V. New Jersey's provision, involved in the principal 
case, is substantially different. "No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same 
offense." N.J. CONST., Art. I, 1[11. 
5 See generally Kirchheimer, "The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy," 58 YALE 
L. J. 513 (1949). 
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the first indictment, 6 or unless the same evidence would sustain a con-
viction in each case.7 By charging the accused with a theoretically different 
offense a prosecutor can frequently avoid the prohibition against a second 
trial.8 A few courts apply double jeopardy whenever the offenses charged 
result from a single transaction or act.9 Properly applied this test could 
provide real protection against harassment but the same courts have 
narrowed this concept to the point where the robbery of two persons at 
the same time, for example, constitutes two different acts.10 This·approach, 
taken by the state courts in the instant case,11 was accepted by the 
Supreme Court as removing petitioner's claim of double jeopardy from 
application. Collateral estoppel, which can arise only after a valid final 
judgment,12 prevents relitigation of issues already determined.13 This 
aspect of the doctrine of res judicata is generally accepted as applicable in 
criminal proceedings by most jurisdictions that have faced the issue.14 
Yet it provides little practical help to a defendant because of the difficulty 
in determining what issues were in fact resolved by a prior general verdict 
of not guilty or guilty of a lesser included offense. In federal prosecutions 
this is a determination of law made by the judge after examining the 
record in the first trial.15 This procedure was accepted by the court 
below in the principal case but the trial judge was unable to determine 
what issues had actually been decided by the jury despite the fact that 
petitioner's sole defense in the first trial had been alibi.16 The majority 
of the Supreme Court refused to upset this ruling and thus held collateral 
estoppel inapplicable as a defense. The criminal defendant's last hope 
against harassment is to invoke the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which protects against an attempt "to wear the accused out 
by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials."17 Apparently no case, 
6 Rex v. Vandercomb and Abbott, 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796); State v. 
Roberts, 152 La. 283, 93 S. 95 (1922); State v. McGaughey, 45 S.D. 379, 187 N.W. 717 (1922). 
7 Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915); Duvall v. State, Ill Ohio St. 657, 146 N.E. 
90 (1924); State v. Magone, 33 Ore. 570, 56 P. 648 (1899). 
s See Lugar, "Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata," 39 IowA L. REv. 
317 (1954). 
9 State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361 (1833); State v. Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474, 106 A. 416 
(1919); Spannell v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. Rep. 418, 203 S.W. 357 (1918). 
10 State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 122 A. (2d) 628 (1956). See also Thompson v. State, 90 
Tex. Crim. Rep. 222, 234 S.W. 400 (1921). 
11 State v. Hoag, note IO supra. 
12 JUDGMENTS RE5TATEMENT §50 (1942). 
13 JUDGMENTS REsTATEll!ENT §45(c) (1942). 
14 Regina v. Miles, 24 Q.B.D. 423 (1890); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 
(1916); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); comment, 27 TEXAS L. REv. 231 at 
239 (1948). 
15 Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951). This case in-
volved use of a criminal prosecution as an estoppel in a subsequent civil suit against the 
defendant but the problem presented was the same as that here considered. 
16 State v. Hoag, note 10 supra. 
17 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 328 (1937). 
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however, has been found to exceed this broad limitation. The question 
may then be raised concerning the extent to which the vague due process 
standard of fundamental fairness might be applied by reference to the 
more precise safeguards of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. The 
Court has already indicated that subjection to double jeopardy is not 
necessarily a violation of due process.18 It has here expressed "grave 
doubts" whether collateral estoppel is a constitutional requirement.19 
Consequently, and in light of a companion case in which the defendant 
was permitted to be tried three times for his life,20 it would appear that 
the constitutional protection of due process may be of only slight practical 
significance to defendants confronted with this type situation.21 It is thus 
left for the states themselves, through remedial legislation, to deal with 
the problem presented22 or else leave their citizens open to successive 
prosecutions for the same criminal activity. 
Robert L. Bombaugh 
18 Palko v. Connecticut, note 17 supra; Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953). 
The holding of the principal case that successive prosecutions for different offenses arising 
out of the same occurrence is not fundamentally unfair is thus not surprising. 
10 Principal case at 471. 
20 Ciucci v. Illinois, note 2 supra. 
21 The fact that defendant in the Ciucci case was charged with a capital offense would 
seem to eliminate any possible argument that the Court might modify its position depend-
ing on the nature of the crime involved. 
22 For an example of one suggested statutory change, see American Law Institute, 
MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 5, §1.08 (1956). 
